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Thumbnail image of book cover: Williams, Biplanes and Bombsights Biplanes and Bombsights: British Bombing in World War I
George K. Williams

1999, 330 pages
ISBN: 1-58566-073-6
$25.00

order no. B-68 | download

Colonel Williams presents a comprehensive study of British bombing efforts in the Great War. He contends that the official version of costs and results underplays the costs while overplaying the results. Supported by postwar findings of both US and British evaluation teams, he argues that British bombing efforts were significantly less effective than heretofore believed. Colonel Williams also presents a strong argument that German air defenses caused considerably less damage to British forces than pilot error, malfunctioning aircraft, and bad weather. That we believed otherwise supports the notion that British bombing raids had forced Germany to transfer significant air assets to defend against them. Williams, however, found no evidence that any such transfer occurred. Actual results, Colonel Williams argues, stand in strong contrast to claimed results.

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Reviews and reader comments:


“One of the frequently discussed topics in military aviation history is strategic bombing and its efficacy. George K. Williams’ fine study of British bombing [WWI] takes us back to the origins of aerial bombardment and sheds light on how the fundamental tenets of strategic bombing doctrine [that were] adhered to throughout most of the twentieth century were initially forged. . . . Standard historiography suggests that interwar theory and faith in strategic bombing, as well as the rationale for an independent air force, was born out of the formative experience of World War I. Williams effectively argues that  the positive assessments of the British of their own bombing program . . . were unfounded and largely contrived. In short, the misrepresentations of bombing were a flawed basis for future military planning. . . A more substantive concluding section would have benefited readers . . . [but] this criticism notwithstanding Williams has provided a valuable contribution to the expanding scholarly literature on air power history.” [Reviewed by Peter L. Jakab in Journal of Military History, April 2000]

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